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Draft Recommendation
on the consequences of developments in Cenlral
and Eastern Europe for European security
The Assembly.
(i) Welcoming the fact that events in the Soviet Union have not modified the guidelines of its
external policy;
(ii) Welcoming the Soviet Union's support in defending the cause of peace and law at the United
Nations Security Council during the crisis provoked by the invasion of Kuwait;
(iii) Considering that the signing of the CFE agreement, although preceded by a redeployment of
Soviet armed forces which places Western Europe out of reach of a surprise attack, has not yet led to a
massive reduction in the level of Soviet armaments:
(iv) Considering as positive the Supreme Soviet's vote in favour of ratification of important parts of
the agreement providing for the reunification of Germany;
(v) Recalling that the new international order, whose principles were affirmed tn the Paris Charter
of November 1990, implies maintaining freedom of expression for all and respect for the rights of
minorities and calls for an intensive effort to find practical means of implementing these prin-
ciples;
(vi) Recalling that the Charter of Paris expresses new principles and includes specific measures for
disarmament, the establishment of a European security system and, in particular, the creation of a con-
flict prevention centre;
(t'ii) Noting the will shown by certain European countries to redirect their internal and external pol-
icies and to seek ways of drawing closer to Western Europe;
(viii) Also noting with great concern the re-emergence of national conflicts in the Soviet Union and in
certain Central European and Balkan countries;
(ix) Noting the extreme difficulties encountered in reforming the economy of all the countries in
these regions;
(x) Considering that, according to the preamble and Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty,
one of WEU's tasks is " to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe ",
there being no limit to the geographical extension of this undertaking;
(xi) Recalling further that Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty invites WEU to co-operate
closely with NATO;
(xii) Underlining finally that Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty does not Iimit participation
in the activities of the Council's subsidiary bodies to member countries and recalling that the Council
has in certain cases invited representatives of non-member countries of WEU to its ministerial
meetings;
(xiii) Welcoming the pursuit of its exchanges with the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union and the
participation of observers from the parliaments of Central and Eastern European countries at its
SCSSlONS,
Rrcorr.rvrNos rHAT rrm CouNctr-
l. Promote, as provided for in the Charter of Paris and in accordance with the recommendations of
the Assembly, the negotiation of a second agreement on conventional forces to establish a true balance
of forces and armaments between the Soviet Union and the deployment of the Atlantic Alliance in
Europe, a second agreement on confidence-building measures extended to the thirty-five countries par-
ticipating in the CSCE and the rapid creation of the conflict prevention centre in Europe;
2
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2. Examine with the democracies of Central and Eastern Europe which are no longer members of
the Warsaw Pact, insofar as they so wish, the conditions for making them " associated countries " by
allowing them to co-operate here and now in:
(a) the activities of the WEU Institute for Security Studiesl
(b) bodies for European co-operation in armaments mattersl
(c) the activities of the Council's subsidiary bodies whose aim is to verify the application of
agreements on the limitation of conventional armaments;
(d) any actrvities of the Council itself intended to consolidate international peace in Europe or
outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty;
3. Foster a rapprochement between those countries and the Community and WEU;
4. Examine any steps that might be taken to ensure application of principles defined by the CSCE
to all European countries, with particular regard to the inviolability of frontiers, in view of the require-
ments of security, respect for human rights and economic and social co-operation;
5. Foster the development of the international mechanism provided for in the supplementary doc-
ument of the CSCE Charter of Paris and to this end support the establishment of a CSCE parlia-
mentary assembly in which WEU would undertake its rightful rdle.
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Draft Order
on the consequ"*' 
"f 13::';!,ff;:;^':,,';;:;"' 
anad Eastern Europe
The Assembly,
Noting the increased interest shown by Central European countries, in particular Poland,
Czechoslovakia and Hungary, in closer relations and co-operation with WEU;
Anxious to respond positively to the political will expressed by these countriesl
Convinced of the importance for WEU of the requirements of Central European security,
l. DEctots to examine carefully the possibility of associating these countries with the activities of
WEU and to define ways and means so as to achieve co-operation that is as tangible and effective as
possible;
2. INsrnucrs its Political Committee to pursue its work in this sense and to report back at the
second part of the thirty-seventh ordinary session;
3. Drcloes to organise, in 1992, a symposium on co-operation between WEU and the Central
European countries which so wish on the establishment of a new security order in Europe.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Caro, Rapporteur)
L lntroduction
l. Europe's immense hopes following the
upheavals in the Soviet Union and the people's
democracies in 1989 and 1990 have been
replaced by some disappointment throughout
many sections of public opinion. There are
several reasons for this:
2. (i) The summit meeting of CSCE coun-
tries held in Paris in November 1990 certainly
had positive results but provided no real guar-
antees of a new peaceful and secure order in
Europe.
3. (ii) The same is true of the agreement on
the limitation of conventional armaments
signed on that occasion. Western experts note
that the Soviet Union has not started genuine
disarmament, it has increased its defence budget
for 1991 and has produced no real reduction in
armaments because of the measures taken by the
Soviet Union to divert its impact.
4. (iii) The conditions of the reunification of
Germany were satisfactory but developments in
Eastern European countries were not consistent
and, while some of them, i.e. Hungary, Poland
and Czechoslovakia, have adopted democratic
r6gimes, changes in the other countries are far
from clear. Furthermore, although the Warsaw
Pact has lost its military structure and the
decision seems to have been taken to disband it
completely, Soviet armed forces are still to be
found wherever they were stationed already,
including in East Germany. even though dates
for their withdrawal have been fixed or are being
negotiated.
5. (i r'l The Soviet Union itself seems to have
encountered the utmost difficulty in imple-
menting perestroika, both economically and
politically. Government setbacks in this area
have led to a two-pronged challenge: on the one
hand. from those who wish the Soviet Union to
move more quickly towards democracy, liber-
alism and autonomy for the republics and, on
the other, from those in favour of keeping the
civil, military and police 6lite leaders in power
and continuing strict economic dirigism and
centralisation round the party and state. In face
of this opposition. the choices that appeared to
have been made in autumn 1990 now seem to be
called in question, particularly with the army's
new grip on Lithuania and then Latvia in
January 1991, which was accompanied by mea-
sures limiting freedom of the press throughout
Soviet territory and extending the powers of the
army and KGB.
6. (r/ Although the Soviet Union's external
policy does not yet seem to have been changed,
the announcement in December 1990 of the res-
ignation of Mr. Shevardnad ze, one of its guiding
lights and a prime mover, has aroused some
concern. The United States Government has
already shown its displeasure at the way the CFE
agreement is being applied and at the Soviet mil-
itary action in Lithuania by deciding to defer the
meeting between President Bush and President
Gorbachev which was to have been held in
Moscow on I lth February. Yet the firm policy
adopted by the Soviet Union towards Iraq
during the Gulf crisis showed that it was still
interested in working out a new international
order. This encourages confidence in future rela-
tions with the Soviet Union.
7. Note should be taken of these changes in
the situation in order to examine what Western
Europe can and must do to ensure its security, as
well as that of Europe as a whole, in the period
of uncertainty and instabihty which seems to be
ahead. Before considering the future organisa-
tion of peace in a reunified Europe, it is
important to be sure that what is hoped to be a
transitional, although long, period during which
the Soviet Union and its former allies seek a new
path does not threaten peace and security in
Europe. This is the aim of the present report.
8. Your Rapporteur took advantage of the
annual meeting between the WEU Assembly
and the Supreme Soviet, held in Paris, to obtain
and assess the views of the Soviet delegation.
Apart from many interesting explanations
relating to matters raised in the present report,
the meeting provided an opportunity for a par
ticularly frank and direct dialogue between rep-
resentatives of the two assemblies. Above all. it
proved that events in the Soviet Union in recent
months did not undermine the will of our Soviet
partners to pursue open exchanges with the
West. thus considerably relieving the fear rightly
felt by some on witnessing a hardening of Soviet
internal policy calling in question the relations
that had existed between that country and
Western Europe for several years.
9. Your Rapporteur was also able to visit
Poland and Hungary where he received a
welcome for which he conveys his warmest grat-
itude to the authorities of the two countries. His
talks there were extremely valuable for the prep-
aration of this report because they allowed him
to make a better assessment of the nature and
importance of the reasons why the two countries
wish to develop their relations with Western
Europe.
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II. Disarmament, security and co-operation
in Europe
10. The countries participating in the CSCE
held a meeting of heads of state or of gov-
ernment in Paris from l9th to 2lst November
1990. With the number of states reduced from
thirty-five to thirty-four because of the reunifi-
cation of Germany, for the first time Albania
was associated and attended the Paris meeting
as an observer. On l9th November. before the
thirty-four-power meeting was opened, the
members of the Atlantic Alliance and the
Warsaw Pact signed the first treaty on the limi-
tation of conventional forces in Europe. On 2l st
November, the Thirty-Four, for their part,
adopted three texts: a general declaration, a
" Charter of Paris for a new Europe ", which
took up and elaborated on the prrnciples
affirmed in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, and a
supplementary document giving effect to certain
of its provisions, which specifies the
composition and r6le of the bodies set up in the
framework of the CSCE.
I l. The purpose of this conference was
twofold. It was obviously a matter of recapitu-
lating progress achieved by the CSCE since the
adoption of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 and
of concluding the first CFE negotiations while
taking into account the changes in Central and
Eastern Europe in 1989 and 1990. From this
point of view, one might say that it was defi-
nitely successful. However, the other aim of the
Paris summit meeting was to design a new
system ofsecurity and co-operation in Europe to
guarantee sure and lasting peace. to ensure the
progress of democratic freedom. to promote eco-
nomic freedom and to take new steps towards
disarmament. In this connection. the reality of
the progress accomplished, and particularly
what might be expected in future years, is a
matter of conjecture.
(a) Disarmament
12. Where disarmament is concerned, the
CFE agreement srgned in Paris on l9th
November 1990 has certain weaknesses and,
furthermore, the way the Soviet Union is
applying it is making the West question that
country's good faith. The Vienna negotiations
were actually conducted on bases which are now
outdated. Although it was accepted that they
were not inter-bloc negotiations, the aim was to
establish a balance in Europe between the two
great systems of alliance. However. by the time
it was signed the Warsaw Pact had been deflated
and the countries of the Atlantic Alliance had, to
varying degrees, started to cut their defence
budgets. The Federal Republic for its part had
entered into commitments with the Soviet
Union to limit the level of its forces in order to
reassure the Soviet Union about the possible
consequences of German reunification so as to
make it easier for the Soviet authorities to ratify
the two-plus-four agreement in view of the neg-
ative reactions of certain conservative elements
towards Mr. Gorbachev's policy. The United
States and the Soviet Union had also agreed to
limit their forces in Central Europe and the
United States Government did not conceal its
intention to reduce its own forces well below the
level of 195 000 men provided for in its
agreement with the Soviet Union, while the
Soviet Union had acceded to the requests of
many member countries of the Warsaw Pact to
take steps to withdraw its forces in the fairly
near future. In Hungary, Czechoslovakia,
Poland and the GDR, this withdrawal had been
started and the first three countries have under-
lined that the signing of the CFE agreement did
not affect their remaining in the Warsaw Pact,
to which the GDR no longer belonged. The min-
isterial meeting of the pact countries in Prague
at the end of February terminated this alliance's
integrated military system and most probably
the pact itself will be abolished before the end of
the year.
13. One of the West's aims in these negotia-
tions had been to obtain a reduction in the
pressure exercised by the stationing of Soviet
forces on European countries members of the
pact. ln previous decades, this pressure had pre-
vented any democratic evolutron in those coun-
tries. From the purely military standpoint, it
was mainly a matter of makrng a surprise attack
on the western part of Europe impossible. It may
be said that these two aims have been attained,
less because of the agreement signed in Paris
than because of the intention expressed by the
Soviet Union and confirmed in several cases,
such as that of Germany, by bilateral texts, to
withdraw, within a reasonable, negotiated length
of time. its armed forces from Central Europe.
However this may be, as long as this withdrawal
has not been completed, a change of tack in
Soviet policy is still possible. Consequently.
NATO's levels must take account of the stages
in the reduction of Soviet forces in Central
Europe and not be reduced too quickly.
14. However. there are certain shortcomings
in the agreement of l9th November 1990 if the
question is no longer to prevent surprise attacks
but to achieve effectrve disarmament.
15. (i) The agreement is applicable only to a
specific area: mainland and insular Europe. In
other words. it excludes the United States and
the Asian part of the Soviet Union beyond the
Urals and the Caspian Sea. It provides for the
establishment of a balance between the groups
of states parties to the agreement within that
area and. according to circumstances, the
destruction or disarmament (in the case of heli-
copters) of weapons exceeding the ceilings fixed.
However. because of the level of the Warsaw
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Pact forces, NATO forces are only slightly
affected by this commitment. In several cases,
their weapons are even distinctly lower than the
ceilings fixed in the CFE agreement. In 1989
and 1990. the Soviet Union for its part withdrew
many of its armaments hitherto deployed in
Europe to the other side of the Urals. Conse-
quently, when the signatory countries to the
agreement gave figures in Vienna for their arma-
ments in Europe as at l8th November, Soviet
levels were low enough for them to have to
destroy only a few without causing a marked
reduction in the Soviet Union's overall military
potential, as shown in the table hereafter. Fur-
16. (ii) The ceilings fixed in the agreement
are at three levels: groups of states parties, i.e.
alliances as they existed at the close of the nego-
tiations 
- 
the composition of these groups
should not be affected by the possible with-
drawal of a state from the Atlantic Alliance or
thermore, some Soviet forces deployed in
Europe were assigned, with their weapons, to the
marine infantry, the coast guard and internal
police forces, thus allowing them to avoid
the limits laid down in the agreement. Mr.
Shevardnadze admittedly explained this in
Washington, London and Paris, where he said
half the weapons withdrawn from Europe would
be used to modernise the equipment of Soviet
forces in the Far East, the rest having to be con-
verted for civil use. However, these are not con-
tractual undertakings; they are subject to no
control and the person responsible for them has
resigned, thus considerably limiting their impact.
the Warsaw Pact: sub-areas, the aim being to
impose greater restrictions in regions where the
two alliances are in contact so as to reduce
further risk of surprise attack; and, finally,
states. Moreover, the sufficiency concept forbids
any state to hold more than one-third of the
Destruction of weapons ander the CFE agreement
l. Artrllery and multrlple rocket-launchers calbre 75 mm and over and mortars 50 mm and over.
2. Tactrcal and antl-alrcralt fighter arrcraft and tactrcal bombers. fighter-bombers and assault arrcraft.
3. Includrng hclrcopters of the naval arr force (KA-25, KA-27, KA-29 and MI-t4).
4. In thrs letter. rt was stated that by the end ol 1990 Soviet conventional armed forces rn the zone would have only about
2i 000 tanks. t.e. a reductton ol 15.7 o/o between lst August 1990 and lSth November 1990. Over the same perrod, there was a
reductron of 21.4 0/o lor artrllery and 9.2 0/o for armoured vchrcles.
5. These cerltngs are those u'hrch wrll apply to the Soviet Union throughout the applicatron of the treaty under the sulfictency
rule. In the allocatron of cerhngs of equtpment in the pact, the Sovret Unron has nevertheless agreed to natronal cerlngs of I 3 I 50
for tanks and l3 175 for preces of artrllery. for rnstance.
6. Plus the drfference between the definrtion given by the pact rn January 1989 (75 mm) and that gr\.en in the treaty ( 100 mm).
(Source: NATO)
WARSAW PACT
Frgures
published
by the pact
(January
r 989)
Figures rn the
ihevardnadze
letter(lst August
r 990)
Frgures grven
on slgnrng
( l8rh
November
r 990)
Cerlrngs
under
agreement
Equipment to be
destroyed or
below ceihng
Accordrng
to earlrer
estlmates
Accordrng
to hgures
on slgnlng
Tanks(of which Soviet Union)
Artillery(of which Soviet Union)
Armoured vehicles
(of which Soviet Union)
Aircraft(of which Soviet Union)
Heliconters
s9 410
41 580
7l 560 r
502151
70 330
45 000
l0 659 r
7 563)
21953
2 2003
24 898 4
l8 300 I
32 320 4
33 191
20 694
26 953
l3 828
42 949
29 348
8 372
6 445
t 602
l 330
20 000
l3 300 5
20 000
137005
30 000
20 000
6 800
5 r50
2 000
l 500
39 470
28 280
5t 5606
36 5756
40 330
25 000
3 859
2 413
785
700
13 l9l
7 394
6 953
128
t2 949
9 348
t 572
L 295(- 3e8)(- 178)(of which Soviet Union)
ATLANTIC
ALLI {NCE
NATO figures
(November 1988)
Tanks
Artillery
Armoured vehicles
Aircraft
Helicopters
22974
t4 458
39 s04
3 977
2 419
25 091
20 620
34 453
s 939
1748
20 000
20 000
30 000
6 800
2 000
2 914(- s s42)
9 504(- 2 823)
4t9
5 091
620
4 353(- 86 1)(- 2s2)
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total in each category of armaments. Appli-
cation of all these principles leads to the fixing
of ceilings that do not correspond to the eco-
nomic facts and responsibilities of the various
parties. Thus, some smaller Eastern European
states have had particularly high ceilings set for
them. To take only one example, the ceiling for
the number of tanks is I 300 for France but
I 800 for Bulgaria. Furthermore, Germany
inherited the GDR's weapons but has a ceiling
of 2 000 tanks and the United States is more
affected than its partners by the obligation to
destroy weapons. The result probably does not
have unduly serious consequences as matters
now stand since most of the Atlantic Alliance
countries are hardly affected by the obligation to
destroy weapons, but the consequences might be
more serious in future if certain countries start
to increase their armaments in order to safe-
guard special interests and if the CFE agreement
is not followed by further agreements that take
account of the new situation in Europe where
the alliances will probably play a smaller part.
11 . (irt) There is no provision in the
agreement on troop levels, apart from a decla-
ration by Germany, undertaking to limit its
armed forces to 370 000 men and an under-
taking by the signatory parties to pursue negotia-
tions on the subject so that an agreement can be
signed at the CSCE meeting in Helsinki in 1992.
Finally, the United States and the Soviet Union
have agreed to reduce their troop levels in
Europe (outside Soviet territory) to 195 000
each.
18. (iv) The agreement gives the Soviet
Union itself the right to have 5 150 aircraft in
the arms limitation zone out of a total of 6 800
for each group of states parties whereas the
Atlantic Alliance in fact has only about 6 000.
19. (ri The agreement specifies that if a
country believes concentrations on the fringes of
the disarmament zone threaten balance in the
zone. it may appeal to a Joint Consultative
Group and, finally. denounce the agreement.
However, thrs provision contains no right of
inspection outside the zone and consequently is
of no great worth. It also provides for rather long
delays between the threat being recorded and
the right to denounce the agreement.
20. (vt) The destruction of weapons made
compulsory in order to bnng declared levels as
at 19th November 1990 down to those provided
for in the agreement must be aI a rate of 250lo in
the first sixteen months, 600/o within twenty-
eight months and 1000/0 within forty months
from the ratification of the agreement. Hence,
the parities laid down in the CFE agreement will
be reached more than three years after ratifi-
cation and it is not yet known when this will be
achieved. It also seems that ratification is
encountering opposition in the Soviet Union
where some circles regret that the agreement
does not concern naval disarmament. For some
years there will therefore be uncertainty about
the balance of armaments in Europe and the
countries of the Atlantic Alliance should
proceed with caution in reducing their forces
and armaments.
21. (r'rf Finally, the agreement provides for
further disarmament negotiations. The first,
planned for 1992, should deal mainly with troop
levels and still be set in the framework of the
members of the two alliances which. in view of
the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact. will
probably not be easy. Only then will global dis-
armament negotiations start, open to all the
thirty-four countries participating in the CSCE.
However, the basic aim of the negotiations has
not been determined. and this leaves consid-
erable uncertainty about the future course ofdis-
armament in Europe.
22. (viii) lt is not due to the CFE agreement
but to the security and confidence-building mea-
sures negotiated on a thirty-four power basis in
the framework of the CSCE that exchanges of
information on the level of armaments among
all these countries have been intensified. While,
during the Vienna negotiations, there was a
remarkable development of such exchanges. it
should be noted that, srnce l9th November, the
sincerity of Soviet declarations has been chal-
lenged, NATO considering that they fall far
short of reality. The signatory states were given
the right to challenge another state if they
believed it necessary to verify military activities
that might endanger their security. Such verifi-
cation will be the responsibility of individual
signatory states and, if the country challenged is
not found to be at fault, the cost will be borne by
the challenging state. This procedure may deter
many countries, either because they lack the
technical means or because they are not pre-
pared to bear the cost of verification.
23. For these reasons. it may be concluded
that, although the CFE agreement signed in
Paris on l9th November 1990 was a step
towards disarmament, it was still too strongly
rnfluenced by past preoccupations, particularly
regarding the balance between the military
blocs, to allow the establishment of structures
for a new order of security and co-operation in
Europe. It relegates preparations for this new
order to subsequent negotiations, whose aims
are but scantily defined. The results of these
negotiations will depend mainly on internal
developments in the European states and the
policies they adopt in the next few years. The
CFE agreement is probably a guarantee against
some forms of aggression but is not enough to
guarantee longer-term peace and disarmament.
It may be wondered whether, in stressing the
search for political advantages such as the with-
drawal of Soviet forces from the territory of
member countries of the Warsaw Pact and
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increasing d6tente. western negotiators paid
enough attention to the truly military aspects of
disarmament. It may also be wondered whether,
in order to speed up completion of the negotia-
tions, the European participants did not rely
unduly on direct contacts between the United
States and the Soviet Union to work out com-
promises which were not always satisfactory for
Europe's security. A more concerted elfort by
members of WEU during the negotiations would
probably have allowed these drawbacks to be
avoided.
(b) The Charter of Paris for a new Europe
24. On 2lst November 1990, at the close of
their meeting in Paris, the thirty-four partici-
pating heads of state or of government signed
this charter. plus a supplementary document on
its application. Here your Rapporteur will
merely analyse the security-related parts.
However, in accordance with the course steadily
followed by the CSCE, thrs charter strongly
underlines the close connection that exists
between security and internal state practices, in
particular " democracy based on human rights
and fundamental freedoms " and " prosperity
through economic liberty and social justice "
provided a responsible attitude is adopted
towards the environment.
25. Hence it is not unimportant that thirty-
four of the thirty-five European countries were
able to subscribe to such provisions as: " We
undertake to build, consolidate and strengthen
democracy as the only system of government of
our nations ", this democracy " having as its
foundation respect for the human person and
the rule of law ", which implies that " the ethnic,
cultural, linguistic and religious identity of
national minorities will be protected and that
persons belonging to national minorities have
the right freely to express, preserve and develop
that identity without any discrimination and in
full equality before the law ". These principles
lead the governments to " note with great satis-
faction the treaty on the final settle-
ment with respect to Germany signed in
Moscow on l2th September 1990 ". Theyjustify the western countries' protests at the
methods used by the Soviet Union in January
1991 against claims by the Baltic countries.
26. Where security is concerned, the govern-
ments refer to the United Nations Charter and
the Helsinki Final Act in declaring: " We renew
our pledge to refrain from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political
independence ofany state, or from acting in any
other manner inconsistent with the principles or
purposes of those documents ". They believe the
CFE agreement and the CSCE process " will
lead to a new perception of security in Europe
and a new dimension in our relations. In this
context we fully recognise the freedom of states
to choose their own security arrangements ",
thus confirming the right claimed by certain
members of the Warsaw Pact to leave that
organisation. They also affirm that: " Wc
recognise with satisfaction the growing r6le of
the United Nations in world affairs and its
increasing effectiveness, fostered by the
improvement in relations among our states ",
which is of particularly great significance now
the United Nations is opposing Iraq's invasion
and annexation of Kuwait.
27. However. the practical measures referred
to in the Paris Charter are extremely vague. In
most cases, the effective tackling of problems is
deferred to subsequent conferences, not all the
dates of which have been fixed:
(i) Participating states " undertake to
continue the negotiations on confi-
dence- and security-building mea-
sures. and to seek to conclude them
no later than the follow-up meeting
of the CSCE to be held in Helsinki in
1992 ".
(ii) They " call for the earliest possible
conclusion of the convention on an
effectively verifiable, global and com-
prehensive ban on chemical
weapons ". Negotiations have been
under way on this matter in Genevafor several years without any
agreement having yet been con-
cluded.
(iii) They affirm their determination to
eradicate terrorism.
(iv) They will " join together in combating
illicit trafficking in drugs ".
(r/ They will seek " effective ways of pre-
venting, through political means, con-
flicts which may yet emerge ". A
meeting of experts was held in Valetta
from I 5th January to Sth February
1991 to examine principles for set-
tling differences and arrangements for
CSCE procedure for settling such dif-
ferences which might constitute a far-
reaching juridical step, particularly
when account is taken ofthe disorder
and national clarms now rife in the
Balkan part of Europe, but. like all
CSCE work. no provtsion is made for
sanctions.
(t'i) They will " continue efforts to
strengthen security and co-operation
in the Mediterranean as an important
factor for stability in Europe " and
" intensify efforts towards findingjust, viable and lasting solutions,
through peaceful means, to out-
standing crucial problems, based on
respect for the principles of the Final
Act " and strive " towards a sub-
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stantial narrowing of the prosperity
gap between Europe and its Mediter-
ranean nerghbours ".
28. It will be noted that, in the definition of
these principles, very little progress has been
made since the 1975 Final Act, at least where
everything related to security is concerned. It
is still couched in vague. general terms and
includes no sanctions. However, developments
in the international situation, with the end of
the cold war and progress towards democracy in
Eastern Europe and also the action taken under
the aegis of the United Nations to enforce inter-
national law in the Middle East, give every
reason to think that implementation of these
principles will encounter far fewer obstacles
than was the case after Helsinki.
29. Moreover, a supplementary document
defines new structures to bolster, if not guar-
antee, implementation. These are:
- 
meetings of heads of state or of gov-
ernment;
- 
a council of ministers for foreign
affairs, providing " the central forumfor regular political consultations ",
which will meet at least once a year;
- 
a committee of senior officials to
prepare the work of the council and, if
necessary. to meet in emergency situa-
tionsl
- 
a small secretariat with its seat in
Prague;
- 
an office for free elections to facilitate
the exchange of information on elec-
tions in participating states and to
foster the sending of observers to such
elections. Its seat will be in Warsaw. It
will be responsible to the council, which
will assign it tasks;
- 
a parliamentary assembly whose pre-
rogatives and composition were not
defined;
- 
a conflict prevention centre, respon-
sible to the councrl and located in
Vienna, to " assist the council in
reducing the risk of conflict ", to give
" support to the implementation of con-
fidence- and security-building measures
such as mechanism for consultation ...
as regards unusual military activities "
and the " annual exchange of military
information ". The centre might also
assume other functions concerning pro-
cedure for the conciliation of disputes.
It will have a consultative committee.
30. These institutional provisions originated
in proposals made by both eastern and western
governments. In particular, there was wide
agreement on making the CSCE permanent, but
on the western side the United States insisted on
the secretariat remaining small. One of the two
most controversial planned bodies was the par-
liamentary assembly which, admittedly. has not
been solved. Taking the Council of Europe as a
model or even usrng it as a basis for the all-
European assembly was opposed by some coun-
tries, such as the United States, which would
find it difficult to allow members of Congress to
be assigned obligations which might distance
them from their national activities. However. it
is the conflict prevention centre that has pro-
voked the most discussion. The Soviet Union
and Germany had planned to give the centre
very wide-ranging responsibilities, e.g. to arbi-
trate in conflicts, whereas the United States sawit merely as a forum for implementing
confidence-building measures in order to ensure
openness in military forces. Initially, at least. the
centre has been assigned fairly modest tasks.
31. The bodies created by the CSCE are
therefore not in themselves capable of carrying
very great weight in European affairs: they
hardly change the nature of the conference,
better adapted to discussions and declarations of
principle than to the exercise of any form of
authority. In particular, it has no executive body
to make reluctant countries apply the directives
to which they have subscribed. Perhaps it will
move in this direction, but this will depend
mainly on internal developments in all the
member countries. There is no guarantee that it
will. however.
32. In the early stage, at least, it will therefore
be for the countries to ensure respect for deci-
sions taken in the framework of the CSCE, yet
the past and present situation in Europe suggest
that they will not be able to do so individually
without arousing suspicion, mistrust and oppo-
sition. Conversely, any association of states
capable of calling in large military forces and
having a nuclear potential might play an
essential role in the deterrent action which may
become necessary if the principles on which the
Thirty-Four managed to agree are violated. Far
from replacing WEU, as some thought, the
CSCE might need WEU to play the r61e in
Europe which the Paris Charter assigned to it.
The Assembly must not lose sight of this consid-
eration in examining the repercussions for WEU
of the emergence of an all-European organisa-
tion for security and co-operation.
III. Uncertainties in Eastern Europe
33. In fact. the shortcomings of the CFE
agreement and Paris Charter would be quite
minor if the trend that started in 1989 and
seemed to have been confirmed by events in
1989 and 1990 had not been called in question
in the Soviet Union itself since the end of 1990.
Admittedly, there is now no reason to think that
l0
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the Soviet Union has changed its external
policy, although Mr. Shevardnadze's resig-
nation. which was announced in November
1990 and took effect in January 1991, suggests
that this policy might no longer be pursued in
the same way. However, internal policy consid-
erations were the reasons given by the outgoing
minister, and his successor, Mr. Bessmertnykh,
seems determined to continue the open policy
pursued in previous years. However, following
the signing of the Paris Charter, at a time when
ratification by the Supreme Soviet of the two-
plus-four agreement on Germany does not cover
provisions relating to the withdrawal of Soviet
forces from the former territory of the GDR and
the CFE agreement has not yet been ratified, one
may wonder whether the obvious hardening of
Soviet internal policy may not jeopardise the
application of the charter and whether the forces
that provoked this hardening will not also bring
their weight to bear in the next stages of estab-
lishing a new security order in Europe.
(a) Soriet Ltnion
34. In order to understand recent events in
the Soviet Union, it should perhaps be recalled
that Mr. Gorbachev's appointment as Secretary-
General of the party in 1985 marked the rise of a
group of relatively young men determined to put
an end to the ultra-conservative regime that had
gradually taken over the leadership of the party
and country, of which Mr. Chernenko had been
a humiliating symbol. It was to carry out far-
reaching reforms, the nature and extent of which
probably failed to obtain unanimity, that these
reformers had formed a group round Mr.
Gorbachev, who clearly had political talents but
presumably did not intend to undermine the
ideological foundations of the Soviet regime. As
from 1985, these men took over crucial posi-
tions, while most of the former leaders from
Mr. Brezhnev's days were moved from office.
They avoided an ideological struggle and started
a series of reforms designed to revive the
economy through a policy of liberalisation cov-
ering most sectors. In fact, the Soviet Union had
no choice. The state of its economy, the inability
of its political system to stimulate the economy
in any way, the lack of community reaction, the
reawakening of nationalism in the federated
republics and the inability of the army to meet
the challenge represented by the adoption of
President Reagan's administration's star wars
programme forced it to revise radically its eco-
nomic structure and the course of its internal
and foreign policy. The great merit of Mr.
Gorbachev's government is certainly to have
assessed the degree of this redirection and to
have taken the necessary initiative.
35. This awareness of the realities of the situ-
ation allowed the Soviet authorities to take a
series of measures at home designed to revive
the economy, stir up competition and restore a
number of freedoms and, abroad, to terminate
Soviet commitments outside its territory, partic-
ularly in Afghanistan, hold negotiations on the
level of conventional forces in Europe, agree to
German reunificatron in NATO, allow the peo-
ple's democracies to determine their own
r6gimes and whether they should remain in the
Warsaw Pact and Comecon and appeal to the
good will of the NATO countries to provide the
capital necessary for reviving the Soviet
economy.
36. The main problem stems from the diffi-
culties encountered in applying perestroika in
recent years and, above all, recent months in
regard to both the economy and the cohesion of
the Soviet state. Where the economy is con-
cerned, it is clear that the reforms carried out,
far from reviving the economy. have, on the
contrary, paralysed it, with the result that there
seem to be insuperable difficulties in supplying
the people with food. Freeing trade led to higher
prices while at the same time the disorganised
public services were unable to keep the markets
supplied. The fact that citizens were free to dem-
onstrate their claims and resort to democratic
procedures for local, national and general elec-
tions on the one hand led many republics to
seek, or sometimes proclaim, their autonomy, or
even independence, and, on the other hand,
throughout the territory there were broad dem-
onstrations against the policy pursued by the
central authorities.
37. These circumstances led to a group of
conservatives being reconstituted. Their aims
are probably as varied as those of the reformers
but their influence in the state increased consid-
erably in the last months of 1990. It is very dif-
ficult to analyse Mr. Gorbachev's manoeuvre
during that period when he shifted his duties
from the party to the state, of which he became
head. It is also difficult to assess the respective
r6les of bodies such as the army, the KGB and
the party in the initiatives taken to restore the
old forms of power. Your Rapporteur will
therefore take into account only facts about
which one can be sure:
38. (i) The group of reformists around Mr.
Gorbachev who guided perestroika in the period
1985-90 is gradually being eased out of office.
They included economists such as Mr. Abalkin
and Mr. Shatalin, responsible for giving Mr.
Gorbachev's government its main economic
guidelines. and also Mr. Shevardnadze, whose
resignation as Minister for Foreign Affairs was
based on an accusation that Mr. Gorbachev
wished to restore the dictatorship. The President
of the Russian Republic. Mr. Boris Yeltsin, now
seems to be the main leader of a movement chal-
lenging Mr. Gorbachev's power, claiming to
pursue and strengthen perestroika as champion
of the power of the republics vis-d-vis the union.
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39. (ry' Although the first signs of nationalism
in the Baltic republics, Transcaucasus and Mol-
davia were met with relative neutrality on the
part of the government, which allowed it to arbi-
trate in the dispute between the Azeris and the
Armenians, this no longer seems to be so since,
in January 1991, the army used force to restore
the authority of the central power in the Baltic
republics. Whether this was due to a government
decision or to an initiative by local military
authorities, as Mr. Gorbachev suggested and as
claimed by members of the delegation from the
Supreme Soviet in meetings with our Assembly,
the matter is serious. In the latter case. it would
mean that Mr. Gorbachev no longer has real
control over the army or the state, thus making
extremely hazardous any confidence one might
have in the Soviet Union moving towards liberal
practices.
40. (iii) lf confirmed, the creation of
" national salvation committees " in these
republics, and then at union level, would mark
the emergence of an organised anti-liberal force
capable of exercising considerable pressure on
the state authorities or even of taking over from
them if they are not sufficiently docile, thus
showing that the evolution since 1985 is now in
danger. So far, these committees have not
announced detailed programmes and it is
impossible to know how far they are determined
to go in resisting change.
41. (it') The free elections held in 1990 to
appoint local authorities were on the whole
favourable to the reformists. In particular, they
are in power in the main cities such as Moscow
and Leningrad and in the Russian Republic,
which includes most of Soviet territory and pop-
ulation. However, while they clearly do not wish
the conservatives to take power, little is known
about their probably not unequivocal positions
in regard to the maintenance of the Soviet state,
the extent of freedoms of all kinds, the rdle of
the party, concessions to be made to minorities
and foreign policy.
42. (v) ln a country where there has never
been stable democracy and the Communist
Party has monopolised power for seventy years,
consulting the electorate is not a means of
returning to stability in the absence of structures
allowing a constitutional expression of opinion.
Everything indicates that the public still strongly
distrusts any form of political power and it no
longer has confidence in Mr. Gorbachev to solve
the economic crisis. restore state authoritv or
ensure respect for the main freedoms.
43. (t,i) On lTth March 1991, the Federal
Government called upon all Soviet citizens to
take part in a referendum on a text worded as
follows:
" Do you think it is necessary to preserve
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as
a renewed federation of equal sovereign
republics in which human rights and
freedoms of all nationalities will be fully
guaranteed? "
In certain republics, subsidiary questions were
also added, particularly in Russia: " Do you
think it essential to create a post of President of
the Federation of Russia elected by universal
suffrage? ", but certain regions such as
Bashkirskaya and North Ossetia did not agree to
this second question being put. In Ukraine and
Byelorussia, the subsidiary question referred to
the renewal of the federation " on the basis of
the declaration of sovereignty " of the republic.
44. The nature of the main question already
makes it difficult to interpret the vote which
relates at one and the same time to the mainte-
nance of the union and its socialism. the sover-
eignty of the republics, human rights and the
rights of nationalities. Six independence-seeking
republics 
- 
the three Baltic republics, Moldavia,
Georgia and Armenia 
- 
refused to organise the
referendum on their territory, which gave a par-
ticularly " unionist " tone to the question put
and made it difficult to interpret the number of
abstentions. As Mr. Yeltsin, the main opposition
leader, did not wish to issue orders on how to
answer this question, the results of the refe-
rendum are particularly hard to interpret, eyen
assuming it was conducted everywhere in a sat-
isfactorily democratic manner, which is
doubtful in the case of the five Central Asian
republics and Azerbaijan. It should be added
that, for the question specific to the latter
republic. the majority is not calculated in the
same way as elsewhere in Russia and the answer
has force of law only if adopted by 500/o of the
electorate. In the other republics and in Russia
itself, in the case of the main question the
majority is calculated according to the number
of votes cast. By and large, the vote probably
shows approval or disapproval of Mr. Gorbachev
and the policy he has been pursuing for the last
six years, although it is not possible to deduce a
clear answer, even on that point, since local con-
siderations are liable to have had a strong
influence on the way the electorate voted.
45. At the time of writing, the final results of
the vote are not yet known. It is therefore too
early to draw lessons from it. It is not very likely
that it will really solve the national problems
that exist in the Soviet Union or allow an
assessment to be made of the respective forces
represented by Mr. Gorbachev, the conserva-
tives and the liberals. It is a pity the first vote of
this kind to be held in the Soviet Union was held
in such cloudy circumstances and it will cer-
tainly not help progress to be made towards
democracy in the country.
46. (r,if While Mr. Gorbachev's external
policy is not being openly called in question, it
is, to say the least, likely that it will fuel dis-
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content, particularly in the army, which has had
to withdraw from European garrisons where it
had a good standard of living to regions with
disastrous living conditions. The evacuation of
Afghanistan. the removal of advisers from many
African countries. its withdrawal from several
people's democracies and the GDR, the collapse
of the Warsaw Pact, the reunification of
Germany in NATO, the CFE agreement, whose
provisions do not cover naval forces, and finally
abandonment of the former Iraqi ally during the
crisis caused by the invasion of Kuwait are all
seen by conservatives as serious setbacks
inflicted by the state on the Soviet army which is
nevertheless still the largest in the world.
47. In these circumstances. there is no doubt
that many Soviet people consider Mr. Gorba-
chev's government to be responsible for the dis-
order throughout the country. the challenge to
state unity, the weakening of its power and the
ruin of its economy even if, in fact, it was the
crisis that brought Mr. Gorbachev to power. The
principal merit he still seems to be granted is to
be able to retain a reserve of confidence in the
West and consequently to bring the Soviet
Union the assistance it needs in order to escape
immediate constraints and revive the
economy.
48. The West, for its part, effectively iden-
tified, perhaps excessively, the Soviet Union's
will for transformation with Mr. Gorbachev's
personality, however much talent he may be
acknowledged to have, moreover. For five years,
Mr. Gorbachev has certainly been a good inter-
locutor. expressing his requirements clearly,
capable of making the necessary concessions to
succeed, inspiring confidence in his partners,
ready to recognise facts and. above all, more
confident in the organisation of international
order than in the strength of a military system to
ensure his country's security. He gave further
proof of this during the crisis caused by Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait. The West was therefore welljustihed in affording the Soviet Union food,
financial and economic assistance to help Mr.
Gorbachev's endeavour to succeed.
49. Nevertheless, it is not for the West to
determine who should run the Soviet Union
and, once Mr. Gorbachev no longer has the con-
fidence of his compatriots, he might admittedly
still enjoy our sympathy but he would no longer
be a valid interlocutor for the West. However, it
is difficult to know to what extent the Soviet
people still accept his authority. It is, to say the
least, strongly contested.
50. Another question is raised by the increas-
ingly repressive trend of the Soviet rdgime in the
last months of 1990 and the first weeks of 1991.
After having had himself voted full powers by
the Congress of Deputies, Mr. Gorbachev
started. or allowed others to start, to take a
series of measures that run counter to the demo-
cratic principles he used to endorse and to which
the Soviet Union subscribed by signing the Paris
Charter. Most serious was the repression of the
independent authorities freely elected and sup-
ported by a large section of the population in the
Baltic republics, in Vilnius and Riga, just when
allied operations against Iraq were starting. The
Soviet armed forces were brought in and firred
on the crowd, killing several people and, on each
occasion, wounding dozens of others. Although
Mr. Gorbachev said he had nothing to do with
this repression, which is a flagrant violation of
the paragraph of the Paris Charter on national
minorities, the responsibility of the Soviet head
of state is obviously at stake even if, as he
asserted, he had not given orders for the army to
intervene, yet he has announced no punishment
for offenders. The partial withdrawal of Soviet
troops from the Baltic republics, announced on
30th January during talks between Mr. Baker
and Mr. Bessmertnykh, while possibly having a
calming effect, falls well short of answering all
the questions raised by the use of force against
the Baltic peoples. It is normal for the Soviet
Union to insist on respect for constitutional pro-
cedures and a certain lapse of time before
responding to the separatism of the Baltic states.
However, undue use of force makes western
public opinion question the true intentions of
the Soviet Government in this matter.
51. What seems even more insidious is the
increase in the area of action of the KGB and
the army, the measures taken against freedom of
the press or those limiting the police powers of
local authorities and making them subject to the
good will of the army since their build-up seems
to announce a return to habits prior to Mr.
Gorbachev's assumption of power. i.e. the resto-
ration of dictatorship denounced by Mr.
Shevardnadze when he resigned. The Baltic
leaders and leaders of the liberal movement
invited the West to react by imposing sanctions
on the Soviet Union. This they hesitated to do
for several reasons. They continue to welcome
the Soviet Union's steady support for the
United Nations since Iraq's invasion of Kuwait,
not only because this helped to isolate Iraq but
above all because it demonstrates the wish to
establish a new order of peace and security
throughout the world based on law. The West
has also noted that this policy corresponds to
that pursued by the Soviet Union in Europe, in
particular in regard to the reunification of
Germany, the self-determination accorded to
the Warsaw Pact countries, disarmament and
the organisation of security and co-operation in
Europe. The West has no interest in interrupting
the development of co-operation which is
probably the best guarantee that this trend will
continue, particularly when several of the inter-
national agreements on which it is based have
not yet been ratified, or in creating additional
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difficulties for the government that initiated it
when its survival is threatened by forces less
anxious for it to be continued. These considera-
tions also guided our Assembly when the
members of its Presidentral Committee decided,
on 3lst January. to maintain its invitation to
the Supreme Soviet for 2lth and 28th February.
This decision was vindicated, moreover, by the
exchanges of views which allowed it to make a
better assessment of the concerns rightly felt by
the Soviet representatives for the survival and
cohesion of their state.
52. Today, in fact. no one can predict whether
perestroika, as launched by Mr. Gorbachev, will
effectively be continued, whether or not Mr.
Gorbachev remains in power. No one knows
whether there is any guarantee of the continurty
of the Soviet state and the lasting nature of the
r6gime. Your Rapporteur therefore draws two
conclusions. First, it is certainly not in the
interests of Europe or of peace to link disarm-
ament and co-operation in Europe either with
the maintenance of a team of leaders in power or
with the pursuit of a specific internal policy. at
least as long as the Soviet Union respects inter-
national commitments to which it has sub-
scribed, inter alia in the Paris Charter. However,
this implies that, when these commitments are
not respected, as was the case in the Baltic
republics. Europe must react in proportion to
the harm done to international order. Second,
however regretfully, we must bear in mind that
the bases on which the peaceful and secure order
that we wish to see established in Europe are still
fragile. On the one hand, this means main-
taining the structures and means which, for
more than forty years, have guaranteed peace in
Europe based on deterrence and the ability to
defend it and, on the other, rn disarmament
negotiations, not to sacrifice guarantees of
Western European security to the development
of d6tente whose pursuit is problematical,
however much good will may be attributed to
the present Soviet leaders.
(b) Central Europe
53. When the Warsaw Pact member countries
realised the extent of the freedom that the Soviet
Union had decided to allow them, they moved
in directions which very quickly were no longer
parallel and concomitant. In each of them, the
party in power tried to make the necessary
reforms so as to be able to remain in control.
basing its authority no longer on the now fragrle
support of the Red Army but on that of a section
of the population whose interests it considered
to be closely linked with those of the Com-
munist Party. In four countries 
- 
East Germany.
Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia 
- 
this
attempt failed and elections brought a new
majority, now in power.
54. The German Democratic Republic disap-
peared in German reunification round the
Federal Republic. As a result of agreements
between the latter country and the Soviet
Union, on the one hand, Poland, on the other,
and. finally, the former occupying powers, all
signed in autumn 1990. the former Democratic
Republic is now part of NATO, WEU. the
European Community and, consequently.
Western Europe. As soon as each treatl,has been
signed by all parties, the " German problem "
will be just another page of history'.
55. In Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia,
new majorities were formed as a result of elec-
tions and are now running those countries. AII
three then took a series of steps to guide their
political and economic structures in a liberal
direction and become progressively associated
with Western Europe without. horvever, causing
too many upheavals. They first ensured that the
Sovret Union would withdraw its troops from
their territory. In the case of Hungary and
Czechoslovakia, thrs should be completed by
June 1991. In the case of Poland. it is to take
longer and is still the subject of negotiations
between Poland and the Soviet Union. Poland
asked that it not be linked with the cvacuation
of Soviet forces still stationed on the territory of
the former GDR, which raises delicate transit
problems. particularly as Poland has asked the
Soviet Union to pay considerable damages for
the transit of forces repatriated from the GDR
through Polish territory. The three countries.joined in February l99l by Bulgaria. announced
their intention to withdraw from the Warsaw
Pact military structures and finally, in February
1991, obtained the abolition of these structures.
The pact itself is to be wound up at the end of
this year. Furthermore, the three countries have
decided to withdraw from the CMEA. whether it
carries on without them or not. and to take part
in no economic co-operation organisation that
would associate them with the Soviet Union.
Clearly they see therr move towards the West as
a more deep-rooted break with the links
imposed on them by the Soviet Union. They cer-
tainly do not wish to do anything that might
seem to be a provocation vis-d-vis that country
but they have resolutely opted for an economic
and political system that draws them closer to
Western Europe and allows them to escape the
uncertainty prevaihng about the future of the
Soviet Union and the other Eastern European
countries.
56. In their relations with Western Europe. it
seems evident that all three seek the closest pos-
sible association with the European Community
and eventually wish to become members
because they consider the Community to be the
centre of the future organisation of Europe to
which they intend to belong. They also know
that it is from the Community they can expect
the economic assistance and investment thev
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need to restore their economies. in ruins after
half a century of communist dirigism and Soviet
domination. Their approaches to the West
therefore seem guided by this concern. Mem-
bership of the Council of Europe was a first step,
already taken by Hungary in October 1990 and
Czechoslovakia on 2lst February l99l and to be
taken by Poland after its next elections, planned
for October 1991. AII three have signed trade
and co-operation agreements with the Com-
munity, where they enjoy most-favoured-nation
status, and aim to attain association status in the
next few years. They have already started to
make far-reachrng changes in their internal legis-
lation so that they can progressively open up
to international competition and the foreign
investment that they encourage. It will be a long
time, however, before they can clear a large
foreign debt and high inflation. particularly in
the case of Poland. which owes $46 000 million
and has an extremely high rate of inflation.
Many Western European countries, the EEC, the
OECD and the United States have at least
granted them considerable assistance in various
forms, including the postponement of debts. and
they have already managed to attract much
western investment. They fear, however. espe-
cially in Poland. that their economic situation,
and particularly the size of their debt, may scare
off European investors, thus making their rap-
prochement with the Community slower and
more difficult.
51. Drawing conclusions from the fairly
similar situation in which they find themselves
and their relative isolation from a security point
of view, Poland. Czechoslovakia and Hungary
are thinking of extending their co-operation in
this sector on the basis of bilateral agreements
containing identical provisions so as to allow
a three-power concerted approach, inter alia
towards the CSCE and the organisation of a new
security order in Europe, since reactions to a
threat against any one of them or developments
in the Soviet Union might reveal new rtsks for
them. They believe that this in no way excludes
rapprochement with western Europe, i.e. with
WEU, intended not only to facilitate their asso-
ciation with the Community but first and
foremost to anchor their own security in a
European organisation that is firmer than the
CSCE can be.
58. These three countries certainly do not
wish to move from one military alliance to
another although they consider the Atlantic
Alliance to be an essential structure for the
security of Europe as a whole. But there can be
no doubt that the three countries first con-
sidered that the transformations in Europe were
leading to a fairly swift disbandment of the two
military blocs and they seem to set great hope in
the organisation of a new system of security and
co-operation in Europe. However. they had to
note that the Paris summit meeting on 19th and
20th November 1990, while introducing some
parts of such a system, did not gii'e them suffi-
cient weight to provide a sure guarantee of the
security of the signatories of the Charter for a
new Europe and they consequently feared being
isolated between Soviet strength and an Atlanttc
Pact which seems likely to weather the crisis.
Hungary and Czechoslovakia thought of joining
the alliance but were not encouraged by the
NATO countries which likewise do not wish to
make the Soviet Union feel events in 1989 and
1990 led to a reduction in Soviet security and a
strengthening of the Atlantic Alhance. Although
prepared to develop exchanges with the Central
European countries. the alliance does not intend
to foster destabilisation in Europe by allowing
them to join.
59. For obvious reasons, these three countries
were determined to give priority to their eco-
nomic recovery rather than their defence pol-
icies, and their defence budgets are small, partic-
ularly as they do not seem to be facing an
immediate threat. In order to escape the grip of
the Soviet Union, they also seem resolved to
diversify their armaments procurement and to
find new partners for reorganising their armed
forces. These partners they have sought in
Western Europe. It is not yet possible to draw up
a list of the contacts they have started and the
decisions they have taken, but some of them, in
particular Poland, clearly saw WEU as a truly
European organisation, linked with the Com-
munity and able to play a major rdle in setting
up a new order of peace and security in Europe.
This emerges clearly from the particrpation of
parliamentarians and ministers from Poland
and Hungary in our Assembly's work. They also
wished to show their solidarity with the other
European countries by seeking symbolic ways of
taking part in the Gulf operations. through
medical assistance, sending two hospital ships
and a medical team to Saudi Arabia in the case
of Poland, and by sending a chemical weapons
decontamination team in the case of Czechoslo-
vakia. However. they are being cautious and
seem to be waiting for relations between WEU,
NATO, the Community and the CSCE to be
clearer before going any further. As for the WEU
countries, while contacts, particularly in the
framework of the Assembly, have been
encouraged by the Council, they seem to be hesi-
tating to go any further, first in order to spare
the Soviet Union, second because not all
members of WEU have the same view of its
vocation and finally because the latter perhaps
do not wish to enter into commitments with
those countries which might imply their
accession to Article V of the modified Brussels
Treaty and there is no explicitly-defined associ-
ation status as in the case of the EEC.
60. It seems certain that. if Soviet policy does
not evolve in a manner they consider threat-
ening, these three countries will try to avoid
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doing anything that might be seen as supporting
a party hostile to that country. At the same time,
they will support any policy aimed at safe-
guarding a European order based on the prin-
ciples defined in the Paris Charter. Insofar as
WEU proves active in this area it will be a
worthwhile partner for them.
61. Moreover. whatever the faults of the
Warsaw Pact. which was an instrument of domi-
nation and not of the security the peoples of
Eastern Europe wanted, it had an obvious merit,
that of imposing a peaceful order in relations
between its member countries. It is essential that
the now agreed disbandment of the pact should
not lead to the disappearance of this order or
lead to a revival of clashes between nationalities,
particularly in the Balkan peninsula. The associ-
ation, in an appropriate manner. of countries
which intend to maintain and promote this
peaceful order in a European security organ-
isation more suitable than the CSCE now is
might be a major step towards achieving shared
security which is a necessary condition for a
lasting organisation of peace in Europe. In
Chapter IV, section (b), of the present report,
your Rapporteur will examine the consequences
he believes WEU should draw from this situ-
ation.
(c) Balkan Europe
62. The position of the Balkan European
countries, be they members of the Warsaw Pact,
like Romania and Bulgaria, or not, like Yugo-
slavia and Albania, is very different. In those
four countries, the communist rdgime has been
seriously challenged but in each, for its own
reasons, the move towards democracy has run
into serious difficulties and at present it is
impossible to anticipate internal developments
in these countries in the next few years. While,
in the case of Czechoslovakia, Slovak calls for
autonomy seem to have been solved in a way
that does not endanger the foundations of the
state and its foreign policy, the four southern
countries are facing far more serious national
minority problems that overlap with ideological
differences and, to varying degrees, threaten the
very survival of the state.
63. Yugoslavia is probably the most serious
case. The first free elections were held in its six
republics in 1990 and four of them now have
non-communist governments whereas Serbia
and Montenegro are still governed by the former
leaders who call themselves socialists. as is the
federation, whose collegial leadership has, since
l5th March, been led by Mr. Milosevic, Pres-
ident of Serbia. The reasons for the electors'
choices are obviously complex and there is no
doubt that the will to maintain Serb domination
over the Kosowo Albanians played an important
part in making up the Serb electors' minds. Con-
versely, hostility to Serb domination of the fede-
ration may have pushed the electorate in the
other four republics to oppose keeping the com-
munists in power and the Slovene government
to proclaim the republic's independence. The
question of the survival of the federation is
therefore raised. This cannot remain a purely
internal affair because of the existence of large
foreign minorities in most of the republics. and
Yugoslavia may well become a hub of tension in
the centre of the Balkan peninsula. During the
first fortnight of March 1991, Belgrade was
shaken by violent anti-government disturbances.
Intervention by the army, quite brutal repres-
sion and the resignation on 15th March of the
President of the collegial leadership of the fede-
ration, Mr. Jovic, were certainly not enough to
quell the storm in Serbia and even less in the
rest of Yugoslavia, since the leaders, like the
anti-communist opposition in Belgrade, vie with
each other in Serb nationalism, thus making the
federation increasingly more difficult for the
other nationalities to accept.
64. In Bulgaria, the proliferation of new
political parties has made it very difficult to
interpret the 1990 elections and tension created
by the fate of a Turkish minority whose very
existence is contested by the state does not help
the establishment of a stable r6gime. In spite of
the proclamation of a multi-party system,
Albania too is having difficulties with its Greek
minority and has made only very tentative
progress towards democratisation. opening its
frontiers and participating in the CSCE. The
economic situation is disastrous and. whenever
it has the opportunity, a large part of the popu-
lation seems determined to emigrate.
65. Finally, the situation is still unclear in
Romania, where the 1989 revolution was trig-
gered off by an uprising of the large Hungarian
minority in Transylvania. There is still a
German minority and Romanian nationalists
are laying claim to Soviet Moldavia where the
Romanian element predominates. Again, the
government is strongly challenged by various
opposition movements.
66. Instability in those four countries has
until now prevented the sweeping economic
reforms their situation requires and isjeopardising the inflow offoreign capital needed
for those reforms. Although the European Com-
munity has granted Romania considerable
humanitarian assistance, it was intended solely
to allow it to face up to the urgency of an
extremely serious crisis. Such circumstances
introduce much uncertainty about the course of
the four countries' external policy, particularly
as the slackenrng of the grip of communist dicta-
torship has brought out the strength of natio-
nalist feelings and claims which might well lead
to violence.
l6
DOCUMENT I263
61. In the years ahead. therefore, the most
serious dangers for internal state order and the
maintenance of peace may surface in that part of
Europe. Here, Europe should exercise sufficient
authority to prevent internal confrontations or
local conflicts from degenerating and states
outside local disputes from intervening and thus
extending them. Of course. only the CSCE might
be able to arbitrate in such conflicts. but this is
not yet the case and, anyway, it has no armed
forces to act in the event of serious crises or con-
sequently exercise a deterrent effect that would
allow such crises to be avoided. Hence. it is
important for WEU to have the political, and
possibly military, means of averting the risks
involved in the continued existence ofan area in
the Balkan peninsula whose instability may well
Iast for quite a few more years.
IV. Europe's security
68. The above considerations lead to a series
of important conclusions concerning Europe's
security in the present decade, however one may
speculate about the more distant and. as yet,
indeterminate future.
(a) The persistence of a threat
69. The threat of a surprise attack by Warsaw
Pact forces no longer exists. The pact itself is
condemned either to disappear, which seems
most probable, or to associate only a few
southern European countries with the Soviet
Union. In any event, it is no longer a threat. Fur-
thermore, Soviet forces in Europe, already con-
siderably reduced, are now limited under the
CFE agreement in conditions which may be ver-
ified by the West. They can rebuild an offensive
system only east of Poland, i.e. 600 km east of
the former demarcation line between the two
German states behind which they were deployed
until 1990. Although there will be Soviet forces
in Central Europe until 1993, they are fewer,
isolated from the inhabitants of the countries in
which they are stationed, separated from those
countries' own armies and apparently prey to an
internal crisis which should detract from their
combat-readiness. Western Europe is therefore
sure to have ample advance warning of any
threat of aggression.
70. However, the Soviet Union still has con-
siderable military strength, most of which
evades the limits laid down in the CFE
agreement, whereas the whole of Western
Europe is subject to the constraints defined in
that agreement. The loss of all Soviet ideology-
inspired driving force, internal difficulties in the
Soviet Union and threats to its economy,
cohesion and direction make it, to say the least,
highly unlikely that this strength will be used for
an offensive policy in the years ahead. However,
a number of possible threats to Europe's security
cannot be wholly excluded:
- 
A civilian or military group might seize
control in the Soviet Union and be
determined to use every means to
restore the old order and wipe out all
that has been accomplished by Mr.
Gorbachev both at home and abroad.
Following the incidents in Vilnius and
Riga in January 1991, Mr. Gorbachev
recognised that the central authorities
had no control over certain military
decisions and that there was a conser-
vative opposition capable of acting
without regard for parliamentary pro-
cedure. The development of such an
opposition and the pressure it might
exerclse would endanger the agree-
ments concluded by the Soviet Union
since 1985 and its leaders might well
make use of external tension to justify
resorting to force in order to re-
establish the old order within the
country.
- 
The Soviet state might disintegrate and
the republics or opposition groups, with
the support of part of the army. might
use force to challenge the central
authorities and the Soviet Union would
succumb to anarchy. It is impossible to
guess who would then have control of
Soviet nuclear weapons and to what use
they would be put. It is also impossible
to imagine what attitude those con-
cerned might have towards neigh-
bouring countries, which would find it
hard to escape the effects of internal
ravages in the Soviet Union. The West
would probably be unable to remain
aloof if one or other of these countries
were seriously threatened.
- 
The restoration of internal order in the
Soviet Union or in a successor state
might allow it again to become a gteat
political and military power. This
would inevitably result in it playing an
active rOle in Europe and, in particular,
in Eastern Europe, to try to recover
positions lost during the present crisis
by supporting powers whose friendship
would not necessarily be based on ide-
ology, just as, at the turn of the century,
the Czarist empire supported Bulgaria,
Serbia and Romania against the
Ottoman or Austro-Hungarian empires.
Thus, if crises were to break out
between Central or Southern European
states, a Russian state might be tempted
to use its strength to solve it in its own
best interests, while Western Europe
might have to do likewise. It is obvi-
ously the r6le of the CSCE to prevent a
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reversion to such situations. but it has
been seen that, at the present juncture,
it has no means of imposing solutions
without the agreement of the partici-
pating countries.
71. In these circumstances, it is essential for
Western Europe to retain a capability equal to
that of the Soviet Union. If the latter makes
clear. decisive progress towards disarmament.
not only in the area laid down in the present
CFE agreement but throughout its terntory,
Western Europe will be able to do likewise.
However. the Soviet Union's attitude is
ambiguous in this connection since. as noted. rt
has managed to ensure that most of its arma-
ments formerly deployed in Europe evade the
destruction specified in the agreement and, in
spite of its economic crisis. it is making a con-
siderable effort to modernise its armaments.
Western Europe cannot therefore abandon the
means which have ensured its security for more
than forty years, i.e. the Atlantic Alliance on the
one hand and its conventional and nuclear
forces on the other, except in the framework of
duly negotiated and verified disarmament agree-
ments designed to guarantee shared security for
all.
72. First, therefore, it may be concluded that
continued disarmament negotiations are an
essential part of Europe's security but that the
present CFE agreement falls well short of guar-
anteeing that security. The next two stages will
relate to troop levels in the two alliances and dis-
armament throughout the area concerned. This
will be particularly delrcate srnce it will be very
difficult to go from the relatively simple search
for a balance between two defensive systems to
the search for a balance between countries which
each have their own concerns and commit-
ments. There is nothing to suggest that these
negotiations will be able to take account of
Soviet armaments outside Europe. These will
probably have to be examined in another type of
negotiations in which the United States will
probably have a leading r6le to play, not only for
forces in Europe, as in the CFE negotiations, but
also for all its armed forces. It will be all the
more difficult to find an acceptable solution
since the Soviet Union has so far asked that the
negotiations be extended to include naval forces.
whereas the distance by sea between the United
States and the old world, on the one hand. and
the responsibilities exercised by the United
States throughout the world, on the other.
compel it to retain consrderable naval power.
Moreover, while an agreement may soon be
reached between the two great powers in the
START negotiations allowing a considerable
reduction in the number of launchers, although
in the long run not very significant in terms ol
the military capability of their strategic nuclear
arsenals. negotiations on nuclear weapons,
which should have a greater impact on these
arsenals, on medium-range missiles launched
from aircraft and ships and on very short-range
weapons. will be more complex and it is far from
clear how the deterrent capabilitl' of the
European powers might be brought into this
framework. There is thus every reason to think
that, as from 1992. the new stages of disarm-
ament will be particularly long and exposed
to all the uncertainty surrounding European
security and that. for some considerable time,
disarmament will not guarantee security in
Europe.
73. Nevertheless, the CFE agreement shou's.if proof is necessary. that the European
members of the alliance have their orvn views to
promote in the disarmament negotiations so as
to avoid defining too narrow an area of appli-
cation and to achieve a balance of forces which
is not to their disadvantage compared with other
European countries. They must also ensure, as
our Assembly has emphasised on several occa-
sions, that Europe is not left on the de jure or de
facto side-lines of the essential verification mea-
sures. In this connection, it should be recalled
that. although the Assembly proposed settrng up
a WEU verification satellite agenc),. the Council
is now merely considering setting up an agency
for co-ordinating the use of data gathered by
observation satellites and has still not taken the
decisions necessary for implementing this pro-
posal, in spite of the standard of the documen-
tation it was given at the symposium organised
by the Assembly's Scientific and Technological
Committee in Rome in April 1990. Yet this
agency is of only limited interest if it cannot
have a European satellite system to provide it
with data.
14. The second conclusion Europe can draw
from the persistence of a threat is that it cannot
dispense with a deterrent strategy. This has so
far been based mainly on the presence of
American forces in Europe. associated with
NATO's military deployment. France's military
efforts and those of a number of countries which
are not members of the Atlantic Alliance but
which wished at least to defend their own
territory. This deployment assured future
aggressors that they would be facing a strong
enough defensive force to remove any hope of
gaining worthwhile advantages from a surprise
attack or. in the case of a massive. prolonged
offensive, of avoiding retaliation by the
American nuclear force, not to speak of those of
the United Kingdom and France that, at each
stage, could raise a possible confrontation to
nuclear level. This system gave Europe forty
years of peace. As long as the Soviet Union has
conventional and nuclear power greater than
that of Western Europe, the latter's security will
have to be based on the maintenance of its
alliance with the United States. In any event,
this alliance is an essentral guarantee of stability
and hence of security for Europe as a whole.
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75. While the Atlantic Alliance is in no way
being called in question. one may henceforth
wonder about the future of the American
presence in Europe and the NATO integrated
military structure.
16. (a) First, while the United States agreed
with the Soviet Union to fix a ceiling of 195 000
for their troop levels in Europe, there are signs
that their forces will be reduced to less than
100 000 men to a level that has not yet been
fixed. In all probability, American forces with-
drawn from Europe to take part in operations in
the Gulf at the end of 1990 and in January l99l
will not return to Europe once peace is restored
rn the Middle East. Western Europe should
therefore make a special effort to bring alliance
forces up to the same level as those of the Soviet
Union and its allies. It will probably not be easy
to do this because the public will have to be con-
vinced of the need to make a further effort to
guarantee its security just when more general
considerations on peace and disarmament might
induce their countries to make substantial
reductions in their delence budgets and troop
levels. For them not to jeopardise European
security, these reductions will have to be Iinked
with a better organisation of collective defence,
they will have to be moderate and must not
precede the disarmament agreements.
71. (b) Provision will also have to be made
for a possible redeployment of American forces
in Europe should this be considered necessary.
In any event, this means continuing to defend
transatlantic lines of communication and main-
taining large stocks of arms, munitions and sup-
plies in Europe to ensure that the time required
for redeployment is not unduly long.
78. (c) From this point of view. the CFE
agreements are a serious handicap to Europe's
security since. while the Soviet Union can still
be ready to build up top-level military strength
in Europe at short notice with its land lines of
communication, this is not so for the Americans
or their European allies, the former being
dependent on long-distance air and naval lines
of communication. The CFE agreement admit-
tedly says each state party shall " have the right
to rvithdraw from this treaty if it decides that
extraordinary events related to the subject
matter of this treaty have jeopardised its
supreme interests. A state party intending to
withdraw shall give notice of its decision to do
so to the depositary and to all other states
parties ... at least 150 days prior to the intended
withdrawal ". including a statement of these
events. There would be a right to withdraw " if
another state party increases its holdings " of
armaments " which are outside the scope of the
limitations of this treaty in such proportions as
to pose an obvious threat to the balance of
forces within the area of application ". This is
tantamount to saying that a state party will not
be able to withdraw from its treaty commit-
ments until 150 days after noting and notifying a
threat. Only then will it be able to start facing up
to the threat. However, as it has no right to hold
stocks of armaments in the area of limitation.
where thc tcrritory o[ most signatory countries is
situated, it will then have to start manufacturing
or procuring the armaments necessary to meet
the threat it has noted. Clearly this provision
will be a decisive advantage for countries with
stocks and means of production outsrde the area
of limitation, i.e. the United States and Canada
on one side and the Soviet Union on the other.
Europeans are therefore liable to become more
dependent on those countries, which will be the
only ones capable of taking up arms fairly
quickly in face of a threatening situation.
19. (d) This obviously does not mean NATO
can and should cling to the concepts that gov-
erned its arrangements up to 1990. i.e. flexible
response and, above all, forward defence, for
which there is no longer any need once Warsaw
Pact forces are no longer in contact with coun-
tries of the Atlantic Alliance. If NATO main-
tains its system, it might be seen as a threat and
consequently make further disarmament and
confidence-building measures more difficult.
Everything indicates that member countries
have become aware of this and are henceforth
endeavouring to define new concepts and a new
organisation, on the one hand by providing for a
minimum deployment. while retaining the pos-
sibility to increase their forces substantially in
the event of tension or crisis. and, on the other
hand, by creating army corps with divisions
from several countries in order to increase the
deterrent effect stemming from the cohesion of
forces from member countnes. Finally. NATO
is considering a large increase in the size of its
mobile force in order to be better able to
intervene decisively in the event of threats to
regions which have hitherto been on the
periphery of its system.
80. (e) For these reasons, the structures ofthe
Atlantic Alliance should be maintained as far as
possible, but also European members of the
alliance should be given a greater rOle in all
areas of allied action rn political and disarm-
ament matters. There will be even greater reason
for this if the United States reduces its rdle in a
collective defence system. Contrary to what has
sometimes been requested, your Rapporteur
does not believe the appointment of a European
commander-in-chief of NATO forces would be a
satisfactory solution since continuing to have an
American in this post is an important means of
linking the United States with the alliance and
NATO's deterrent capability. Conversely, he
feels that Europe might carry greater weight in
allied action if WEU effectrvely played the r6le
of European pillar of the alliance, one of its con-
stant aims that has never really been effectively
achieved. It is certainly not a matter of limiting
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WEU's ambitions to that function alone, since it
is indeed its recent activities in areas outside
NATO's purview that have allowed it to develop
consultations between its members in political
and military matters. but this aspect of WEU's
r6le must not be neglected.
81. In this connection, your Rapporteur per-
sonally considers that if France played a greater
and steadier part in NATO's activities, without
either its forces or its territory being integrated,
this would help to strengthen Europe's r6le. The
agreement between NATO and Spain shows that
membership on such a basis is not impossible
and the new situation in Europe has consid-
erably reduced many of the reasons for the inte-
gration of forces being part and parcel of close
participation in many NATO bodies.
82. In the long run, relations between WEU
and NATO and WEU's rdle in Europe's
response to the threat still represented by Soviet
military strength depend on how NATO
manages to adapt itself to the new situation and
give Europe the security guarantees it needs. In
any event, WEU will have to show that Europe
is still determined not to accept Soviet domi-
nation, not only over Western Europe but also
over those Central and Eastern European coun-
tries which have freely chosen to escape from it.
To implement this determination, it will have to
adapt itself to whatever the Atlantic Alliance
becomes in order to give maximum effectiveness
to a collective security system associating
Europe with its United States and Canadian
allies and to allow Europe to exercise more
influence over alliance policy. particularly in
everything related to d6tente and disarmament,
in view of the less important rdle American
forces will be playing in NATO's military
deployment.
(b) Risks of destabilisation in Europe
83. The new-found freedom of former
Warsaw Pact countries to choose therr r6gimes
and the course of their external policy corre-
sponds to the West's constant aims. It is a
welcome fact that some of them have used this
freedom to set up truly democratic institutions,
hold free elections and redirect their foreign
policy. It has to be noted that others have not, or
not yet, taken such clear decisions on these three
points. However, these differences involve
certain risks for the future, since:
(r) Ideological clashes are quite possible
rn some countries and these mayjeopardise their relations with neigh-
bouring countries.
(ii) The ethnic and linguistic shape of
certain states is being called in
question by part of the population
belonging to minorities also repre-
sented in neighbouring countries
which consequently cannot remain
unmoved by internal developments
in those countries. In fact, questions
could be raised about nearly all the
frontiers of Central and Eastern
Europe and rivalries concealed for
half a century by the order imposed
by Soviet power may resurface with
new intensity.
(ii, A number of conflicts may therefore
come to the fore and certain great
powers, Iike the Soviet Union with its
Romanian minority in Moldavia and
Ruthenian or Polish minorities in the
Ukraine may be tempted to impose
their views in ideological conflicts
and national confrontations.
(iri Although the CSCE, particularly at its
Paris summit meeting in November
1990, has managed to define prin-
ciples by which such conflicts should
be solved, it has been unable to set up
institutions or sufficiently binding
procedures to impose peaceful solu-
tions. It is a matter of some conster-
nation that. two months after signing
the Paris Charter, the Soviet Union
openly violated its undertakings by
resorting to brutal force to impose its
will in the Baltic countries.
84. This situation is admittedly not a direct
threat to Western Europe. It nevertheless
involves a number of risks for Europe's peace
which must not be ignored. On the one hand, it
cannot allow a great power to take advantage of
such circumstances to impose its domination in
a region which has just slipped out of its grasp.
On the other hand, the Western European coun-
tries have both bilateral and multilateral rela-
tions with the Central European countries that
they are developing and preparing to increase.
The most typical case is that of Italy, which has
started to organise its relations with Austria,
Hungary. Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia in a
new context, but this is not the only one. Poland
and Hungary in particular now have very close
relations with several Western European coun-
tries, including certain forms of co-operation in
defence matters, alongside their relations with
the Council of Europe. In other words. because
d6tente is not between blocs but allows each
country to re-establish tradrtional relations or
establish new ones, it may lead Western
European countries in diverging directions
whenever relations between Central and Eastern
European countries become difficult.
85. Your Rapporteur believes this has various
consequences of direct concern to WEU:
86. (i) It is essential for all the WEU member
countries to be kept continually informed about
each other's relations with Central and Eastern
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European countries. Before WEU was reacti-
vated, such exchanges of information were the
Council's main activity at ministerial level.
Since then, rt is clear that its discussions have
been reorientated. about which no one is com-
plaining. However. it is important for these
practices to be continued or resumed. Naturally,
a large part of such exchanges are now a matter
for political co-operation but, insofar as they
concern security and defence matters. which is
increasingly often the case, WEU is the appro-
priate framework for their development.
87. (ll) Since Greece and Turkey applied for
membership of WEU. the Council has been
keeping them informed of its activities. When
the Gulf crisis started. the WEU Council invited
a number of member countries of the Atlantrc
Alliance or of the European Community which
are not members of WEU to take part in some of
its activities, on one basis or another. To varying
degrees, Denmark, Norway, Greece and Turkey
showed their solidarity with the WEU countries
on that occasion. Your Rapporteur considers
that, when the Council handles matters relating
to disarmament. security and co-operation in
Europe, it might, in certain cases at least, send
similar invitations to Central European coun-
tries which have shown they intend to pull away
from the Sovret alliance, which co-operate in
one way or another with WEU countries in
security matters, which have set up democratic
institutions and which show real interest in
establishing a new security order in Europe and
in all the aims assigned to WEU in the modified
Brussels Treaty. For instance, this is the case of
Hungary, but it is not the only one. It would be a
particularly appropriate way of showing that
Europe's security is not the private stamping
ground of nine countries but that the latter are
determined to consider every aspect with all
countries really prepared to do so. Furthermore,
Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty
allows non-member countries to be associated
with subsidiary bodies of the Council. There is
nothing to prevent these countries taking part in
meetings of the Council, whose activities are of
direct concern to them. Although association
with WEU cannot be made a rigid status,
flexible forms of association with its activities
would correspond to its vocation today.
88. (iii) This practice should allow WEU to
play a rOle that is essential until such time as the
CSCE makes more definite progress towards
organising and guaranteeing a new order of
peace and security in Europe. It was noted
above that the CSCE has no executive body and
therefore does not have the executive means
that are essential for the principles it defines to
be applied and for it to be able to arbitrate in
any conflicts. Only states are able to provide it
with these means. However, in view of the
quarrels, rivalries and protective practices, or
even domination, that marked the nineteenth
and twentieth century history of Europe. it
hardly seems desirable for anf individual state
to be made responsible for enforcing CSCE deci-
sions. An international organisation grouping
states with varied interests and open to an1'
European powers wishing to take part in some of
its activities would quite obviously arouse feu'er
negative reactions than any individual state
whatsoever. WEU might thus play' a deterrent
r6le in regard to all countries thrnking of
resorting to force to impose its ou'n interests
without taking account of the requirements of a
European order.
89. (lr/ Today, it is not easy to see how WEU
should be organised in order to play this rdle of
active CSCE instrument to ensure that a new
order of peace and securitl' rs established in
Europe. Recent experience of the Gulf war sug-
gests that it will be rvell placed for such a task
insofar as it will be distinct from other
organisations with different aims, be it NATO,
whose main aim is to guarantec the West against
any threat from Soviet military power, or the
Community, whose primary r6le is to unite
member countries more closely in areas within
its purview. WEU, u'hose task is to guarantee
the security of European countries and whose
structures are extremely flexible. is. at present.
the body best prepared to take action to bring
about a new European order defined in the
framework of the CSCE. It must give shape to
these possibilities to allow Europeans to place at
the service of an international order, in Europe
itself, their ability to deter and consequently to
take action without the United States or the
Soviet Union necessarily being involved in such
matters. Measures taken to facilitate thc
co-ordination of national action ouside the
NATO area might help.
(c) Risks outside Europe
90. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait recalled to what
extent Europe's security depends on main-
taining peace in the rest of the world. It also
showed that WEU, thanks to its flexible struc-
tures, was the most appropriate body to organise
a reaction by European countries not all of
which were prepared to become involved to the
same degree and in the same way in an oper-
ation whose objectives had been determined b1'
the United Nations and which meant placing
national forces under American command in an
affair that was outside NATO's responsibilities.
Apart from a few aspects directly' affccting the
new order of security in Europe. your
Rapporteur will not develop this matter further
as it is outside his terms of reference and will be
dealt with in other reports.
91. (i) The development of detente. under-
standing and co-operation in Europe which fol-
lowed the new trend of Soviet pohcy and the
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independence won by a number of Eastern
European countries was an essential factor when
the Security Council had to condemn Iraq's use
of force against Kuwait and to plan retaliatory
measures to bring Iraq to heel. Thus. the Soviet
Union voted for all the resolutions tabled in the
Security Council in this connection after
reaching agreement with the United States on
their wording and China itself voiced no oppo-
sition. Nor did the Soviet Union oppose
allowing its citizens the right to emigrate to
Israel but used rts consequent influence on the
state of Israel to urge it, at the same time as the
United States, not to use its right to respond to
Iraqi attacks, thus showing its concern to
prevent the conflict spreading or degenerating
into a clash between the West and the Arab
countries.
92. (ll Several members of the Warsaw Pact
- 
Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia 
- 
have
participated in operations in the Gulf to enforce
Security Council decisions by giving medical
assistance or assistance in protection against the
effects of chemical weapons. In this way, they
intended to demonstrate their solidarity with
countries contributing to military efforts and
hence their endorsement of a new European
order no longer based on the system ofblocs. In
these circumstances. it would seem normal for
these countries to be asked to attend meetings of
the Council when the aftermath of the Gulf
affair is discussed on the same basis as other
countries which are not members of WEU and
within limits corresponding to the magnitude
and nature of their commitment.
93. (zlr) WEU's action should allow the
European countries to voice their views on
Middle East affairs, particularly in regard to the
settlement of the Palestinian question and that
of Lebanon and, perhaps, play a part when that
of Kuwait is settled. when it will be a matter of
guaranteeing respect for the provisions of the
agreement on which peace is restored. Pre-
venting the conflict appearing to be a clash
between the United States and Israel, on the one
hand, and the Arab peoples on the other, cer-
tainly helped to limit the extent of the confron-
tation and its consequences.
94. (lr/ These considerations bring new
importance to Article VIII of the modified
Brussels Treaty which, on the basis of the fact
that Europe's security is closely linked with
keeping the peace in the rest of the world, gives
WEU universal responsibilities which the North
Atlantic Council lacks and allows the member
countries to adopt very close measures of mil-
itary co-operation without jeopardising their
right freely to determine the principle and level
of their participation in operations to maintain
or restore peace, particularly in the context of
the application of Security Council decisions.
Thus, they lead to the conclusion that, although
WEU can and must be the European pillar of the
alliance, its r6le does not stop there. Outside the
NATO area, it is the instrument by which an
external European policy. as would be definedin the framework of twelve-power political
co-operation, can be implemented from the
moment it implies recourse to force.
V. Conclusions
95. In conclusion, your Rapporteur feels the
prospects heralded by the transformation of the
Soviet Union, the emancipation of the people's
democracies and the reunification of Germany
encouraged European public opinion to be over-
optimistic. On the one hand. no account was
taken of the obstacles that the Soviet Union and
the Central and Eastern European countries
would quite naturally encounter as soon as they
had to make a radical reassessment of their ide-
ology, political and economic organisation and
external policies. Moreover, after more than
forty years of measuring their defence efforts in
terms of the immediate danger of Soviet mil-
itary power at the service of an ideology and a
threatening policy, the western countries are
finding it rather difficult to grasp that the disap-
pearance of this threat does not remove all the
possible danger from the Soviet Union but, on
the contrary, leads to the emergence of certain
risks for international peace and consequently
European security which might arise in Europe
itself or in regions of the world outside the
NATO area.
96. Revealing that the danger still exists and
that these risks are emerging must certainly not
be allowed to jeopardise what has been achieved
and, in particular, to slow down the negotiations
on disarmament and the organisation of a new
order of peace and security in Europe. One of
WEU's rdles is to facilitate these negotiations. Itis able to make a substantial contribution
because it is the only European security
structure which has not been called in question
by recent events and because it is the only
defence organisation in which European states
meet outside the influence of the great powers.
This r6le is also facilitated by the flexibility of
its structures which allow all kinds of possibil-
ities for non-member countries to be associated
and the possible abstention of member countries
in operations in which it does not suit them to
take part, apart from those provided for in
Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty. WEU
also has the advantage of its de facto links with
twelve-power Europe, i.e. with the Community,
which. more than ever, forms the pole of
attraction round which European union can one
day be achieved, and with poltical co-operation.
This link is admittedly not yet a juridical reality,
but its institutionalisation by the creation of
bridges between these three institutions is
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among the aims the Twelve set themselves at the
Rome conference in December 1990. National
administrations are already co-ordinating their
action in the three forums, as they did several
times during the Gulf crisis and in particular in
Paris on lTth January, when the Twelve met at
the close of the meeting of the WEU Council of
Ministers. This link is above all evident in the
eyes of the governments of non-member coun-
tries. Wishing to draw closer to the Community.
they are starting to make a similar movement
towards WEU: after Norway and Turkey,
Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland have just
made this plain in the Gulf affair.
91. Thus, however fragile and incomplete the
transformation of East-West relations may be, it
marks the start of a period in which WEU must
define itself in three different ways which are
not contradictory but nor are they the same.
(, WEU is the European pillar of the
Atlantic Alliance and, as such, it
ensures Europe's participation in a
system of defence and deterrence
which remains necessary as long as
the Soviet Union has a military
potential that enables it to threaten
peace in Europe and the security of
Western Europe.
WEU offers member countries an
instrument for examining together
their aims in disarmament and the
organisation and maintenance of
peace and security in Europe. If nec-
essary, it should give them the means
to intervene to ensure respect for the
principles defined by all states partic-
ipating in the CSCE.
In areas within its purview, WEU
heralds a future European union
master of its foreign policy and its
defence. Decisions taken by the
Twelve in Rome guide it in this
direction and place rt among the
bodies destined to come together
under the authority of the European
Council.
98. This is a considerable extension of the
prospects open to WEU and it is evident that it
cannot choose between them but must manage
to conduct at one and the same time the action
of the nine governments in these three direc-
tions. This is the necessary condition if coun-
tries, each of which is more or less inclined to
advance in one or other direction, are to be able
to agree to achieve decisive progress in all three.
(ii)
(i ii)
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